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| Abdul Malik Al Houthi |
In the twelfth year of the conflict between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Ansarullah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi has once again turned his sights on Riyadh — and this time, the subject he has chosen touches the most sensitive nerve in the entire Islamic world: Mecca and Medina.
In a series of recent televised addresses, al-Houthi not only denied Saudi allegations that his forces had targeted the holy cities, but went on the offensive with a striking claim: Zionist companies are entering the property markets of the two holy cities through legal channels, and the Saudi regime has "opened the door" for them.
The Core Logic of the Allegation: "The Same Script, From Palestine to the Holy Cities"
In his speeches, al-Houthi constructs an argument rich in historical analogy. He points out that the Zionist entity's expansion did not begin with military occupation, but with the purchase of property in Palestine — first securing a foothold, then advancing incrementally, until Palestinians were confined to Gaza and the West Bank. According to him, the same "soft path" is now being played out in Mecca and Medina.
Al-Houthi goes further, claiming that "the faith, words and plans of the Zionists" are explicitly directed at Mecca, Medina and the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, with the ultimate aim of "carving up Mecca and Medina, swallowing the whole of Palestine and large swathes of the Arab world." This framing nests Saudi Arabia's foreign investment liberalisation directly within a narrative of "Zionist expansion."
In his speeches, al-Houthi constructs an argument rich in historical analogy. He points out that the Zionist entity's expansion did not begin with military occupation, but with the purchase of property in Palestine — first securing a foothold, then advancing incrementally, until Palestinians were confined to Gaza and the West Bank. According to him, the same "soft path" is now being played out in Mecca and Medina.
Al-Houthi goes further, claiming that "the faith, words and plans of the Zionists" are explicitly directed at Mecca, Medina and the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, with the ultimate aim of "carving up Mecca and Medina, swallowing the whole of Palestine and large swathes of the Arab world." This framing nests Saudi Arabia's foreign investment liberalisation directly within a narrative of "Zionist expansion."
The Policy Reality Behind the Allegation: The "Gap" in Saudi Arabia's Foreign Property Laws
Al-Houthi's claim is not entirely detached from policy reality. In 2026, Saudi Arabia formally implemented the accompanying regulations to its Non-Saudi Real Estate Ownership Law — a key plank of Vision 2030's drive to attract foreign capital. The new framework replaced the previous case-by-case approval model with a system of designated geographic zones, offering foreign individuals and entities a clearer path to purchasing property in the Kingdom.
Crucially, Mecca and Medina are indeed included among the zones where foreign ownership has been approved, albeit with explicit religious restrictions: ownership in the two holy cities is limited to Muslim individuals and to entities registered and licensed in Saudi Arabia. From a religious jurisprudence standpoint, non-Muslims are in any case not permitted to enter Mecca's core area — a restriction that is not in dispute.
The gap in the argument, however, lies precisely in corporate ownership structures. Under the new rules, companies registered in Saudi Arabia but with foreign investors in their shareholder base may hold property in designated zones, including specific development projects in the holy cities — such as the Abraj Al Bait and Jabal Omar developments in Mecca, and central Medina. The "Zionist companies" al-Houthi refers to point, in practical terms, to precisely such entities: businesses operating legally within the Saudi framework but with foreign capital participation behind them. In his narrative, this indirect shareholding structure is characterised as "infiltration."
Al-Houthi's claim is not entirely detached from policy reality. In 2026, Saudi Arabia formally implemented the accompanying regulations to its Non-Saudi Real Estate Ownership Law — a key plank of Vision 2030's drive to attract foreign capital. The new framework replaced the previous case-by-case approval model with a system of designated geographic zones, offering foreign individuals and entities a clearer path to purchasing property in the Kingdom.
Crucially, Mecca and Medina are indeed included among the zones where foreign ownership has been approved, albeit with explicit religious restrictions: ownership in the two holy cities is limited to Muslim individuals and to entities registered and licensed in Saudi Arabia. From a religious jurisprudence standpoint, non-Muslims are in any case not permitted to enter Mecca's core area — a restriction that is not in dispute.
The gap in the argument, however, lies precisely in corporate ownership structures. Under the new rules, companies registered in Saudi Arabia but with foreign investors in their shareholder base may hold property in designated zones, including specific development projects in the holy cities — such as the Abraj Al Bait and Jabal Omar developments in Mecca, and central Medina. The "Zionist companies" al-Houthi refers to point, in practical terms, to precisely such entities: businesses operating legally within the Saudi framework but with foreign capital participation behind them. In his narrative, this indirect shareholding structure is characterised as "infiltration."
Saudi Response and the Houthi Counterattack
Riyadh has not responded directly to the property allegations, but on the military front, the Saudi-led coalition recently accused Houthi forces of attempting a drone attack on Mecca, claiming Saudi air defences intercepted the devices south of the holy city's no-fly zone. The Muslim World League promptly issued a statement condemning the Houthis' "terrorist act" as a threat to the peace of the holy sites and civilians.
The Houthi counterattack was equally sharp. Their leader dismissed the Saudi attack allegations as "the lie of the age" and "naked slander," stressing that the Yemeni people would defend Mecca and the Islamic holy sites "with their lives and property." Al-Houthi went on the offensive, accusing Saudi Arabia of targeting more than two thousand mosques during the Yemen war, including historic sites far from the front lines.
A Houthi official said on social media that the Saudi claim of an attack on Mecca was a "stale tune" that "fools no one any longer." Iran also weighed in, with its foreign ministry spokesman warning that the region had "repeatedly seen false flag operations" and urging restraint.
Riyadh has not responded directly to the property allegations, but on the military front, the Saudi-led coalition recently accused Houthi forces of attempting a drone attack on Mecca, claiming Saudi air defences intercepted the devices south of the holy city's no-fly zone. The Muslim World League promptly issued a statement condemning the Houthis' "terrorist act" as a threat to the peace of the holy sites and civilians.
The Houthi counterattack was equally sharp. Their leader dismissed the Saudi attack allegations as "the lie of the age" and "naked slander," stressing that the Yemeni people would defend Mecca and the Islamic holy sites "with their lives and property." Al-Houthi went on the offensive, accusing Saudi Arabia of targeting more than two thousand mosques during the Yemen war, including historic sites far from the front lines.
A Houthi official said on social media that the Saudi claim of an attack on Mecca was a "stale tune" that "fools no one any longer." Iran also weighed in, with its foreign ministry spokesman warning that the region had "repeatedly seen false flag operations" and urging restraint.
The Houthis' Strategic Intent: From the Yemen Battlefield to the Battle for Islamic World Narrative
The timing of al-Houthi's intervention on the holy cities' property issue reflects clear strategic calculation.
First, it is a symmetrical response to Saudi narrative warfare. Saudi Arabia has long portrayed the Houthis as "Iranian proxies" and a threat to the holy sites. By redirecting the spotlight onto "Zionist infiltration," al-Houthi seeks to complete an identity shift in the Islamic world's narrative arena — from accused "attacker" to defender of the sanctuaries.
Second, the narrative targets sentiment on the Arab street. With the Gaza conflict ongoing, "Zionist expansion" carries natural mobilising power. Juxtaposing Saudi Arabia's foreign investment liberalisation with the history of Palestine — "land purchased, then occupied, then squeezed" — is a highly emotive piece of political rhetoric. Its intended audience is not policymakers but the broader Muslim public.
Third, al-Houthi is using it to reinforce his position as a core member of the "Axis of Resistance." As the leaderships of Hamas and Hezbollah have been severely degraded by Israeli strikes, the Houthi leader has emerged as Iran's "most resilient Arab ally" in the region. By extending the resistance narrative from the Yemeni battlefield to the holy cities, the Houthis seek to position themselves as defenders of the entire Muslim ummah.
The timing of al-Houthi's intervention on the holy cities' property issue reflects clear strategic calculation.
First, it is a symmetrical response to Saudi narrative warfare. Saudi Arabia has long portrayed the Houthis as "Iranian proxies" and a threat to the holy sites. By redirecting the spotlight onto "Zionist infiltration," al-Houthi seeks to complete an identity shift in the Islamic world's narrative arena — from accused "attacker" to defender of the sanctuaries.
Second, the narrative targets sentiment on the Arab street. With the Gaza conflict ongoing, "Zionist expansion" carries natural mobilising power. Juxtaposing Saudi Arabia's foreign investment liberalisation with the history of Palestine — "land purchased, then occupied, then squeezed" — is a highly emotive piece of political rhetoric. Its intended audience is not policymakers but the broader Muslim public.
Third, al-Houthi is using it to reinforce his position as a core member of the "Axis of Resistance." As the leaderships of Hamas and Hezbollah have been severely degraded by Israeli strikes, the Houthi leader has emerged as Iran's "most resilient Arab ally" in the region. By extending the resistance narrative from the Yemeni battlefield to the holy cities, the Houthis seek to position themselves as defenders of the entire Muslim ummah.
Conclusion: The Real Tension Between Fact and Narrative
At the level of verifiable fact, al-Houthi's claim that "Zionist companies are buying property in Mecca and Medina" lacks publicly available evidence. Saudi law provides explicit protection for the holy cities' religious character, and the route by which foreign capital may participate in commercial real estate there through Saudi-registered companies is bound by a regulatory framework.
At the level of political communication, however, the potency of the allegation does not depend entirely on factual accuracy. It touches a genuine tension: when the economic logic of Vision 2030 collides with the inviolable religious symbolism of the holy cities, any grey area will be exploited by geopolitical rivals. Al-Houthi has thrust that tension into the spotlight, and whether or not Riyadh responds, the debate over the holy cities, capital and sovereignty will not easily subside.
Between the ruins of the Yemen war and Saudi Arabia's grand reform blueprint, Mecca and Medina remain symbols that cannot be reduced to economic data. Who is permitted to draw near to them — and who stands accused of seeking to control them — is itself a war without gunfire.
At the level of verifiable fact, al-Houthi's claim that "Zionist companies are buying property in Mecca and Medina" lacks publicly available evidence. Saudi law provides explicit protection for the holy cities' religious character, and the route by which foreign capital may participate in commercial real estate there through Saudi-registered companies is bound by a regulatory framework.
At the level of political communication, however, the potency of the allegation does not depend entirely on factual accuracy. It touches a genuine tension: when the economic logic of Vision 2030 collides with the inviolable religious symbolism of the holy cities, any grey area will be exploited by geopolitical rivals. Al-Houthi has thrust that tension into the spotlight, and whether or not Riyadh responds, the debate over the holy cities, capital and sovereignty will not easily subside.
Between the ruins of the Yemen war and Saudi Arabia's grand reform blueprint, Mecca and Medina remain symbols that cannot be reduced to economic data. Who is permitted to draw near to them — and who stands accused of seeking to control them — is itself a war without gunfire.
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