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| Mojtaba Khamenei |
The landscape of Middle Eastern geopolitics shifted dramatically on February 28, 2026 . The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the ascension of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to Iran's Supreme Leadership has fundamentally altered the calculus of Iran's nuclear ambitions—and the world is paying close attention .
For decades, the late Supreme Leader's nuclear fatwa—a religious decree against nuclear weapons—served as a rhetorical and theological barrier to Iran's weaponization. But according to recent U.S. intelligence assessments, Mojtaba Khamenei represents a marked departure from his father's ambivalence .
The question on everyone's mind: Is Iran on the verge of developing a functional atomic bomb, and how will its new leader shape that trajectory?
The Stakes: What Iran Currently Possesses
Before examining the leadership question, we must understand the physical reality of Iran's nuclear program. The numbers are sobering.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), prior to recent conflicts, Iran possessed approximately 440 kilograms (970 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity—just a technical step away from the 90 percent weapons-grade material needed for a nuclear bomb . This stockpile is sufficient, if further enriched, to produce fissile material for nine to ten nuclear weapons .
Here's the crucial detail: despite extensive U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in 2025 and 2026, that stockpile remains largely intact . While enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan suffered significant damage, the uranium itself is believed to be buried deep within underground tunnel complexes, beyond the reach of conventional bunker-buster munitions .
"The capability is largely still there," Ellie Geranmayeh, an Iran expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, recently told The New York Times .
The Intelligence Assessment: Father vs. Son
Here's where Mojtaba Khamenei enters the picture—and why his leadership matters so profoundly.
U.S. intelligence has concluded that Iran's new Supreme Leader is "far more" inclined to seek nuclear weapons than his father was . The assessment, detailed in a New York Times report, is based on intercepted conversations and information gathered before the current war. It paints a picture of a leader who does not share his predecessor's hesitation .
Crucially, the distinction extends beyond mere inclination. According to U.S. intelligence, Mojtaba Khamenei is not interested in a crude "asset"—a device that would be difficult to mount on a missile but might provide basic deterrence. Instead, he reportedly seeks a warhead that can be miniaturized and mounted on a long-range missile . This represents a far more ambitious—and destabilizing—strategic vision.
Ali Khamenei, by contrast, is broadly believed to have been ambivalent about pursuing the nuclear weaponisation pathway, issuing his fatwa in the 1990s as a theological barrier . While the fatwa technically forbids the use of nuclear weapons rather than their development, it nevertheless served as a constraint on hardliners within the regime .
Those hardliners, it appears, have now found a more receptive audience in the new Supreme Leader.
The Context: War, Damage, and Renewed Ambition
It would be a mistake to view Mojtaba Khamenei's apparent nuclear ambitions in isolation. They emerge from a specific context of conflict and perceived vulnerability.
Since the war erupted in February 2026, Iran has endured devastating military strikes. Mojtaba Khamenei himself was wounded in the Israeli strike that killed his father and has not appeared publicly since—likely due to severe injuries . The regime has suffered significant losses to its nuclear infrastructure, including:
Damage to three key enrichment sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan
Destruction of weaponisation facilities and the headquarters of Iran's weaponisation program (SPND)
Elimination of nuclear scientists in targeted strikes
Disruption of the centrifuge supply chain
However, these setbacks may have paradoxically strengthened the case for weaponisation. According to U.S. intelligence assessments, hardliners within the regime who favour nuclear weapons have seen their position strengthened, arguing that such weapons are now necessary to protect the Islamic Republic from future attacks .
This is the logic of deterrence: having been attacked, Iran's leadership may conclude that only a nuclear arsenal can guarantee its survival.
The Contradictions: Public Stance vs. Private Intentions
In public, Mojtaba Khamenei has not called for Iran to build nuclear weapons. His official statements—as limited as they have been since his injury—affirm the regime's commitment to protecting Iran's nuclear capabilities without explicitly declaring an intention to weaponise .
But U.S. intelligence suggests a divergence between Tehran's public negotiating position and its private internal discussions . Reports indicate that Iranian officials have discussed the nuclear agreement internally in a manner "inconsistent with what they were telling the mediators and the US" .
This gap between words and intentions is precisely what IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi highlighted when he called for a "very strong system of verification" to monitor Iran's nuclear programme . As Grossi put it: "Intentions are not enough. In order to have certainty, we need to have a very strong system of verification" .
Currently, Iran continues to deny IAEA inspectors access to its most sensitive nuclear sites, making verification impossible .
The Timeline: When Could Iran Build a Bomb?
The answer depends on who you ask—and what assumptions you make.
U.S. intelligence estimates suggest Iran remains approximately 9 to 12 months away from being able to assemble a crude nuclear device . However, some analysts argue this represents a worst-case scenario. The Pentagon estimated in July 2025 that the strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years from weaponisation, while CIA Director John Ratcliffe suggested the timeline was set back by "years" .
Israeli estimates place the timeline at two to three years, factoring in the damage to enrichment facilities, centrifuge supply chains, and weaponisation infrastructure .
What's clear is that the military strikes have slowed but not stopped Iran's program. The stockpile of highly enriched uranium remains intact. The technical expertise remains. The question is political: will Mojtaba Khamenei make the decision to cross the threshold?
The Wider Implications: What Comes Next?
Should Iran make the decision to weaponise, the consequences would reverberate far beyond the Middle East.
A regional arms race could ensue, with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states reconsidering their nuclear strategies . The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could face its most severe challenge since its inception. Global energy markets could be disrupted, with the Strait of Hormuz becoming an even more volatile flashpoint .
For now, Iran remains a nuclear threshold state—possessing the material, technology, and expertise to build a weapon relatively quickly, but not having made the final political decision to do so . The question of whether that decision will be made rests, in no small measure, on the shoulders of a wounded, reclusive, and reportedly hardline new Supreme Leader who may see nuclear weapons not as an option, but as a necessity.
Conclusion: A Threshold Moment
Mojtaba Khamenei's rise to power represents a watershed moment for Iran's nuclear program. Unlike his father, who displayed ambivalence and issued religious decrees against nuclear weapons, the new Supreme Leader is assessed to be more open, more ambitious, and more determined to pursue weaponisation .
Coupled with Iran's substantial stockpile of highly enriched uranium and the lessons learned from being attacked, this creates a volatile mix. The military strikes have delayed but not eliminated the threat. The uranium remains buried but accessible. The political will may now be aligning in favour of crossing the threshold.
As IAEA Director-General Grossi noted, intentions are not enough . The world needs verification. But verification requires access—and access is precisely what Iran is denying.
The question is not whether Iran can build a nuclear weapon. It is whether Mojtaba Khamenei will ultimately decide that he must. And on that question, the intelligence community's assessment is increasingly clear: he may be far more inclined to say yes than his father ever was.
It would be a mistake to view Mojtaba Khamenei's apparent nuclear ambitions in isolation. They emerge from a specific context of conflict and perceived vulnerability.
Since the war erupted in February 2026, Iran has endured devastating military strikes. Mojtaba Khamenei himself was wounded in the Israeli strike that killed his father and has not appeared publicly since—likely due to severe injuries . The regime has suffered significant losses to its nuclear infrastructure, including:
Damage to three key enrichment sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan
Destruction of weaponisation facilities and the headquarters of Iran's weaponisation program (SPND)
Elimination of nuclear scientists in targeted strikes
Disruption of the centrifuge supply chain
However, these setbacks may have paradoxically strengthened the case for weaponisation. According to U.S. intelligence assessments, hardliners within the regime who favour nuclear weapons have seen their position strengthened, arguing that such weapons are now necessary to protect the Islamic Republic from future attacks .
This is the logic of deterrence: having been attacked, Iran's leadership may conclude that only a nuclear arsenal can guarantee its survival.
The Contradictions: Public Stance vs. Private Intentions
In public, Mojtaba Khamenei has not called for Iran to build nuclear weapons. His official statements—as limited as they have been since his injury—affirm the regime's commitment to protecting Iran's nuclear capabilities without explicitly declaring an intention to weaponise .
But U.S. intelligence suggests a divergence between Tehran's public negotiating position and its private internal discussions . Reports indicate that Iranian officials have discussed the nuclear agreement internally in a manner "inconsistent with what they were telling the mediators and the US" .
This gap between words and intentions is precisely what IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi highlighted when he called for a "very strong system of verification" to monitor Iran's nuclear programme . As Grossi put it: "Intentions are not enough. In order to have certainty, we need to have a very strong system of verification" .
Currently, Iran continues to deny IAEA inspectors access to its most sensitive nuclear sites, making verification impossible .
The Timeline: When Could Iran Build a Bomb?
The answer depends on who you ask—and what assumptions you make.
U.S. intelligence estimates suggest Iran remains approximately 9 to 12 months away from being able to assemble a crude nuclear device . However, some analysts argue this represents a worst-case scenario. The Pentagon estimated in July 2025 that the strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years from weaponisation, while CIA Director John Ratcliffe suggested the timeline was set back by "years" .
Israeli estimates place the timeline at two to three years, factoring in the damage to enrichment facilities, centrifuge supply chains, and weaponisation infrastructure .
What's clear is that the military strikes have slowed but not stopped Iran's program. The stockpile of highly enriched uranium remains intact. The technical expertise remains. The question is political: will Mojtaba Khamenei make the decision to cross the threshold?
The Wider Implications: What Comes Next?
Should Iran make the decision to weaponise, the consequences would reverberate far beyond the Middle East.
A regional arms race could ensue, with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states reconsidering their nuclear strategies . The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could face its most severe challenge since its inception. Global energy markets could be disrupted, with the Strait of Hormuz becoming an even more volatile flashpoint .
For now, Iran remains a nuclear threshold state—possessing the material, technology, and expertise to build a weapon relatively quickly, but not having made the final political decision to do so . The question of whether that decision will be made rests, in no small measure, on the shoulders of a wounded, reclusive, and reportedly hardline new Supreme Leader who may see nuclear weapons not as an option, but as a necessity.
Conclusion: A Threshold Moment
Mojtaba Khamenei's rise to power represents a watershed moment for Iran's nuclear program. Unlike his father, who displayed ambivalence and issued religious decrees against nuclear weapons, the new Supreme Leader is assessed to be more open, more ambitious, and more determined to pursue weaponisation .
Coupled with Iran's substantial stockpile of highly enriched uranium and the lessons learned from being attacked, this creates a volatile mix. The military strikes have delayed but not eliminated the threat. The uranium remains buried but accessible. The political will may now be aligning in favour of crossing the threshold.
As IAEA Director-General Grossi noted, intentions are not enough . The world needs verification. But verification requires access—and access is precisely what Iran is denying.
The question is not whether Iran can build a nuclear weapon. It is whether Mojtaba Khamenei will ultimately decide that he must. And on that question, the intelligence community's assessment is increasingly clear: he may be far more inclined to say yes than his father ever was.
Disclaimer: This article synthesises current intelligence assessments and expert analysis as of the date of publication. The situation remains fluid, and assessments are subject to change as new information emerges.
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